




















































There are many problems with temporal continuity, but 
there is a hard one for those philosophers who believe 
that the world is existentially dynamical. In particular, 
this holds for those who take seriously the require-
ment that in such a world must vary what exists unre-
strictedly. As a paradigmatic case study, the paper 
discusses the Growing Block Theory (GBT) of time, as 
recently presented by Correia and Rosenkranz who 
consider temporal passage in the strong existential 
sense of the term. Then, it will be shown that their 
account fails to do justice to the continuity-require-
ment: nothing comes next. Without the time contin-
uum, however, the genuinely temporal character of the 
dynamics gets lost: the objection of spatial analogue 
turns back. Finally, the paper suggests that Kantian 
consciousness-dependence is what one needs in 
order to get a genuinely temporal dynamics that really 
makes it distinguishable from mere variation across 
space.
GROWING BLOCK THEORY TIME CONTINUUM KANT
Cord Friebe is professor of  
philosophy at Siegen University. 
His research ranges from the phi-
losophy of physics to analytic met-
aphysics and Kant, with a particu-




























































 I will discuss a new formulation of the Growing Block Theory of time, recently pre-
sented in the monograph Nothing to Come by Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz 
(2018). Accordingly, the world is existentially dynamical: only the past and the pres-
ent exist, but the future has to come. The advantage of Correia/Rosenkranz’s ap-
proach, to be spelled out in Section 2, is that it really takes seriously the requirement 
that what exists unrestrictedly (simpliciter) must vary with time. It therefore should 
be viewed as the most promising account of existential dynamics.
However, in Section 3 I will argue that the block is not constantly increas-
ing, that the account cannot adequately represent the continuity of time: nothing 
comes next. Moreover, without the time continuum, the genuinely temporal charac-
ter of the dynamics gets lost: against this version, one can raise the objection of spa-
tial analogue, i.e. nothing excludes that there is such a dynamics also, but then: mys-
teriously, across space. In particular, the relativistic version of Correia/Rosenkranz’s 
growing block view turns out to be unsatisfactory, precisely because of the lack of 
time continuum.
In the final Section 4, I will suggest that Kant’s theory of time being origi-
nally pure intuition may close the gap: objective time flow is existentially continuous 
in virtue of, i.e. ontologically dependent on, the continuity of subjective time. Kant 
presents a metaphor of time that is close to the growing block view: a line insofar 
one draws it. Then, Kant falls down the same objection as the current approach, un-
less he adds that the representation of time must be accompanied by the I think, by 
self-consciousness.
The paper has a wider underlying motivation than that of providing an ar-
gument against the growing block view. I believe that any metaphysics of time that 
considers temporal passage in the strong existential sense of the term must answer 
the challenge of doing justice to the continuity-requirement. Further, I also believe, 
in general, that Kantian consciousness-dependence is what one needs in order to get 
a genuinely temporal dynamics that really makes it distinguishable from mere var-
iation across space. Thus, the case at hand should be taken as a paradigmatic case 
study. – Regarding the main topic of this Special Issue, i.e. “Time-Continuum”, the 
spirit of the paper can be characterized in this way: There are probably many prob-
lems with the continuity of time, but there is a hard one especially for those philos-
ophers who believe that the world is existentially dynamical. In particular, this holds 
for those who take seriously the requirement that in such a world must vary what 
exists unrestrictedly, as Correia/Rosenkranz in fact do. Then, however, this challenge 
is not restricted to this particular version of the growing block view, but stands for all 
metaphysics being truly existentially dynamical.
II. The Growing Block Theory of Time
The Growing Block Theory (GBT) is intended to be the existentially dynamical on-
tology according to which the sum total of existence is always increasing. Always, 
new slices of existence appear without ever disappearing, and so the present is al-
ways new and the whole of the world is constantly growing. Intuitive as it seems, the 
GBT nonetheless faces various conceptual problems. The first set of problems con-
cerns the idea of being “existentially dynamical”: it will be shown, in this section, that 
its main difficulty can be solved by a new formulation of the GBT. The second crucial 



























































growing”: as it turns out, in the following section, this difficulty remains unresolved 
even with the most promising account at hand.
To clarify the GBT, it is helpful to contrast it 
with the Moving Spotlight Theory (MST). 1 For, as we 
will see, the MST does not have the difficulties under dis-
cussion. The contrast shows that not all notions of dy-
namism are subject to the first criticism. The argument 
only affects an existentially dynamical ontology, as GBT. 
Further, the second criticism does not affect the MST. Its 
notion of continuity is based on Cantor’s set-theoret-
ical account of the continuum, whereas the intended 
GBT-continuity cannot (see the following section). Time-Continuum faces a particu-
lar problem within existentially dynamical ontologies. According to the MST, it varies 
temporally what is objectively present. Therefore, it can be considered as a dynamical 
ontology. However, this temporal variation occurs across the block universe, “given” 
as much as according to eternalism, the static ontology of time. The objective varia-
tion of what is present is not a variation of what exists; the MST-ontology is accord-
ingly not existentially dynamical. By contrast, defenders of the GBT must argue that 
it varies temporally not only what is objectively present but also what exists. Then, 
the problem is that the notion of what exists is ambiguous: also eternalists surely be-
lieve that dinosaurs and computers are located at different times, and so they could 
accept, in some way or other, the GBT-idea that the world as of some time is larger 
than the world as of an earlier time. The question hence arises whether proponents of 
the GBT really can distinguish their view from reasonable eternalism.
One way of spelling out this difficulty requires the distinction of two dif-
ferent conceptions of existence, namely “existence 
simpliciter” and “existence@”. 2 The first captures the 
non-perspectival sense of being in the domain of un-
restricted quantification. Applied to spacetime physics, 
one can say that something exists simpliciter iff it is lo-
cated somewhere in spacetime, at some spacetime point p or other. If spacetime as 
a whole is static (i.e. not growing), this expresses the idea of the block universe. The 
second sense of existence captures the merely perspectival sense of being located at 
a given time, applied to spacetime physics: of being realized with respect to a given, 
particular spacetime point p0. 3 Eternalism is, therefore, 
analogous to modal realism according to which some-
thing exists simpliciter iff it is located somewhere in the 
whole of possible worlds, i.e. iff it is located in some pos-
sible world or other, whereas something exists@ iff it is 
located within a given, particular possible world. Then, 
proponents of the GBT must argue that it varies tem-
porally what exists simpliciter. For, a mere variation@ 
can and should be allowed by eternalists as well. However, the long-lasting most fa-
mous proponent of the GBT characterizes his own view in such a way that every 
eternalist could accept for her block universe view: «what exists as of one time, dif-
fers from what exists as of another» (Tooley 1997, 16; see the reply in Mellor 1998, 
83). In such a way, there is no temporal variation of what exists simpliciter but only 
a variation@, i.e. a variation of what exists from one temporal perspective compared 
with what exists from another temporal perspective. This is compatible with the 
view that the block universe as a whole is static (i.e. eternalism), but that, restrictively 
1 The MST combines the block 
universe view (eternalism) with 
the idea that an objective, irre-
ducible property of presentness 
is moving across the block. In 
the last couple of years, this the-
ory has found new friends; see 
Cameron (2015) and Deasy (2015). 
The standard reference for good-
old eternalism is Mellor (1998).
2 It is very close to similar dis-
tinctions in Sider (2001, 59) 
and Lewis (2004, 3-4); for more 
details see Friebe (2018, sec. 1).
3 Depending on the specific space-
time structure, everything located 
on an absolute plane of simulta-
neity (containing p0), or everything 
located outside the lightcone of 
p0, or only the event located at p0 
itself may be considered as exist-



























































speaking, what there is with respect to one spacetime point differs from what there 
is with respect to another. Thus, the challenge for proponents of the GBT is to spell 
out the (constant) growing in terms of existence sim-
pliciter. 4 Recently, Correia and Rosenkranz (CR 2018; 
CR 2019) have presented a significantly improved ver-
sion of the GBT. According to them, Tooley et al. conflate 
two different commitments: a rather trivial one, shared 
by everyone, with a substantial one being characteristic 
for the GBT. Consider the following statement (exam-
ple taken from CR 2019):
“Broccoli is presently to be found somewhere, but was nowhere to be found in 800 BC.”
This sentence is true. It is so in virtue of merely empirical reasons. Therefore, it should 
be accepted as true by every philosopher. Here, on the other hand, is the substantial 
commitment:
Broccoli is presently something, but was nothing in 800 BC.”
This sentence is true or false not only on empirical grounds but can be accepted as 
true only by non-eternalists (presentists included). In terms of the foregoing, the lat-
ter sentence expresses that with the appearance of Broccoli has changed what exists 
simpliciter.
Correia/Rosenkranz themselves go a different way of spelling out the 
difficulty at issue: they don’t accept the assumption that there are different sens-
es of existence and instead hold that the alleged perspectival sense of existence is 
nothing over and above “location”. One should carefully distinguish, they argue, be-
tween “temporal existence” and “temporal location”, which leads to the counterin-
tuitive way of talking that, e.g., Dinosaurs exist now but are located somewhere else, 
at some time in the past. Moreover, the whole account is idiosyncratically written 
in Timothy-Williamson-(2013) language, which makes the reconstruction not easier. 
Undoubtedly, however, the advantage of their approach is that now there is a GBT on 
the market according to which it really varies what exists simpliciter.
Formally, the growing block universe can fully be captured by the following 
two principles (with E!: “exist”; G: “always in the future”; T: “time”; At: “shift”; H: “al-
ways in the past”):
(P1) E!x → GE!x
 
(P2) Tx → At x, H¬E!x
To understand the formulas, one should notice that: 
1. Every predication/quantification is tensed.
2. Principles allow prefixing by any combination of the universal quantifier 
and ‘Always’.
3. E!m → TE!m; with T: ‘true simpliciter’.
Accordingly, the sentence “E!x” is shorthand for: Always, ∀x Always, E!x, and so 
E!x should be read as: “Always everything always exists now”. This is Williamson’s 
4 In the words of the grounding 
father of the GBT:«“the essence 
of a present event is, not that 
it precedes future events, but 
that there is quite literally noth-
ing to which it has the relation of 



























































characterization of “permanentism”, i.e. eternalism. It is always true simpliciter that 
dodos exist now (‘although’ they are now located in the past).
Correspondingly, GBT’s first principle “(P1) E!x → GE!x” should be read as: 
“Always everything will always in the future be something.” Nothing never ceases 
to exist. Further, GBT’s second principle “(P2) Tx → At x, H¬E!x” should be read as: 
“Always every time at itself was nothing before, i.e. is new.” At itself, every time is 
freshly added to the block. Consequently, for times (and 
residents in time), 5 E!m is true simpliciter although not 
always true. Therefore, what exists simpliciter varies 
temporally, along the idea of freshly added slices of ex-
istence that never cease to exist. To sum up, the dialec-
tics is that there is a future for existentially dynamical 
ontologies. Not only varies what exists@ – in some per-
spectival sense from t to t’ –, as it could be satisfied also by eternalism, but it varies 
what exists unrestrictedly. However, there is a second requirement to be satisfied: 
the variation must be continuous, otherwise it is not really temporal. The following is 
devoted to this second problem.
III. GBT’s Problem with the Continuity of Time
The GBT, as it stands, is intended to capture the idea that «the sum total of exist-
ence is always increasing» (Broad 1923, 66). 6 The block 
is conceived of as «constantly growing without ever 
eroding» (CR 2018, 44), so that time «constantly pass-
es» (CR 2018, 66), in the existential sense of the term. 
Thus, the GBT not only is intended to be an existentially dynamical ontology of time 
but also to do justice to the continuity of time. 7 In this 
section, it will be shown that even the most promising 
account of the GBT cannot do this latter job. Further, it 
will be argued that, without an adequate representa-
tion of the continuity of time, the temporal character of 
the existential dynamics gets lost.
To begin with, look carefully at Correia/Rosenkranz’s way of translating 
Broad’s slogan that the block is always increasing into their language: «always there 
is a new resident of time that was nothing before» (CR 2018, 36). On the grammat-
ical surface, the expression «is [always] increasing» sounds dynamical, while «[al-
ways] there is [something new]» sounds static, but Correia/Rosenkranz apparently 
believe that also ontologically increasing is essentially being new; always growing is 
nothing other than always being greater. However, this is wrong. For, the continuity 
of growth is not guaranteed by always being greater.
The problem is that the last moment, the edge of being, will not have an im-
mediate successor. Either there will be a gap between the newest moment and all the 
older ones, or together with the newest moment infinitely many other new moments 
(simultaneously?) appear. This criticism seems to be an old-fashioned, Aristotelian 
defence against Cantor’s account of the continuum, but in fact it is crucial for this 
(and, presumably, for all) existentially dynamical view(s) of time. By contrast (again), 
the MST does not have this problem.
For, the MST presupposes (in CR’s terms) “permanentism”, i.e. E!x. the sim-
pliciter-existence of past, present, and future times (and residents in time). It, there-
fore, assumes the existence of Cantor’s continuum of (space-)time points. Then, the 
5 Throughout the paper, I assume 
that everything being said 
holds likewise for past, pres-
ent, and future times and for 
past, present, and future resi-
dents (things, objects, events).
6 The italics in the quotations of 
this section are always mine.
7 A discrete sequence such as 
“2, 4, 6, 8, […]” is (strictly) mono-
tonous but not “constantly grow-




























































MST is distinguished from eternalism by the additional claim that some time is ob-
jectively present. This property of presentness is assumed to move constantly across 
(space-)time, so that it could be the case that proponents of the MST also have the 
difficulty of doing justice to the continuity-requirement. That in fact they have not 
can be seen in the context in which Correia/Rosenkranz seek to avoid a frozen pres-
ent for the MST – an ontologically distinguished moment of time that, unfortunately, 
is always the same. Formally:
∃x(Tx & x is present & H¬(x is present) & G¬(x is present) & ∀y(Ry & y is present → y L x))
Interpretation: «It follows that always there is at most one time that is present. It 
likewise follows that a given time is only ever present once, and hence that always a 
distinct time is present» (CR 2018, 73).
Apparently, the given formula alone cannot exclude a somehow jumping 
present, i.e. a non-continuous motion of presentness. However, in the MST nothing 
differs substantially from Cantorian mathematics: taken the given formula togeth-
er with a notion of precedence, some ε/δ-like definition will do the job of avoiding 
the jumping present. For every ε, there will be a δ such that […], so that the present 
is moving continuously, in the ε/δ-sense of the term. This might work, thanks to the 
eternalist assumption that guarantees non-empty neighborhoods of every moment 
that is present.
Contrariwise, in the adequate GBT any neighborhood of the (new and) last 
moment of time is half-sided empty:
As Correia/Rosenkranz frequently stress, it is really nothing to come. Everything in 
the past (within the block) exists, but nothing regarding the future. The term “ex-
istence” is unique, so that regarding the future nothing is real in some other sense of 
being. The sentence “E!m” is, if true, true simpliciter although not always true, which 
means that constants do not always refer, they do not necessarily have referents. 
Correia/Rosenkranz apply non-classical, ‘free’ logic in order to get the intended exis-
tential dynamics. All this is good, but the consequence is that the neighborhood of the 
present is half-sided empty.
No ε/δ-like definition can therefore be applied to get the continuity of grow-
ing, nothing comes next. In other words: the present is considered simply to be the 
new and last moment of existence, but it has no inherent motion, it is not directed to-
wards the future. The lacking continuity apparently goes hand in hand with a lack of 
temporal directionality. Prima facie, the block represents a certain time direction by 
virtue of constantly becoming greater. However, this is illusionary. Dynamics rather 
comes from nowhere, the adding of fresh slices of existence apparently is orthogo-
nal to the alleged direction of the growing. The block, in particular the edge being, is 
not acting while becoming greater, whereas “growing” suggests that the edge of be-
ing (or, the block) is doing something. In this way, the temporal character of the ex-
istential dynamics gets lost.
I will explain this further in the last section. Let me firstly add a different 
argument that shows that, even though Correia/Rosenkranz’s GBT-dynamics real-
ly is existential in the sense that it varies what exists simpliciter, there is no reason 
FIG 1 Screenshot of the growing 
block:Around the edge of being, the 



























































to believe that this existential variation really is temporal. For, against the account 
one can raise the objection of spatial analogue, i.e. the argument – usually present-
ed against eternalism – that everything said about time can also be said about space, 
which shows that the distinguishing character of time is missing.
Look again at the two principles of the GBT:
(P1) E!x → GE!x
(P2) Tx → At x, H¬E!x
Now, one can construct a spatial analogue by substituting all the temporal notions 
with non-temporal ones. Here is it (with  and  meaning ‘everywhere in the upper 
[lower] side’; and with s: “place”):
(P1) E!x →  E!x 
(P2) Sx → @x  ¬ E!x
One gets an existential dynamics across space: everywhere everything everywhere 
in the spatial upper-side (of it) continues to exist; and for any spatial location s, at s, 
everywhere in the lower-side of s, s did not yet exist. Simpliciter-facts change across 
space. Counterintuitive as it may, nothing in the GBT-account at hand forbids that.
Moreover, Correia/Rosenkranz themselves construct a relativistic GBT in 
precisely this spatial-analogous way (see CR 2018, chap. 9). With regard to Special 
Relativity, they rightly hold that «we must make spacetime-points our basic points 
of evaluation», but wrongly conclude that
[we must] appeal to no objective structure of spacetime other than the fourfold division, de-
termined by each such point, between that point itself, those points in the causal past of it, 
those in the causal future of it, and those in the elsewhere region of it. (CR 2018, 135)
Instead of appealing only to the lightcone-structure of relativistic spacetime, one 
would expect, from a non-eternalist perspective, that (the concepts of) timelike 
curves and proper times also are included into the objective structure: “proper-time” 
is usually considered to be the fundamental notion of time.
By contrast, Correia/Rosenkranz claim that «variation in what exists, if any, 
must accordingly be understood as variation across spacetime rather than time» (CR 
2018, 136). In particular, this claim has to be understood as the rejection of the idea 
that there is variation along a timelike curve. For, this would be variation across (prop-
er-)time rather than unqualified spacetime. In this way, 
so-called spatiotemporaryism 8 turns out to be an exis-
tentially dynamical ontology lacking the temporal char-
acter. In more detail, Correia/Rosenkranz distinguish – 
along the literature on the Putnam/Stein-controversy 
– between «pointy relativistic GBT» and «bow-tie rel-
ativistic GBT» (CR 2018, 150). Both versions have the 
two principles in common; with  and  now meaning 
‘everywhere in the upper [lower] lightcone’, and with s 
now meaning “spacetime point”. They disagree as to whether the elsewhere regions 
are populated or not, e.g., the pointy-version affirms: “at any given spacetime-point, 
the elsewhere region is unpopulated” (CR, 2018, 149).
8 “Temporaryism” is their term 
for “non-eternalism” (oppo-
sed to “permanentism”). 
“Spatiotemporaryism” is hence 
opposed to the (relativistic) block 
universe view, in their terms: “«the 
spatiopermanentist view according 
to which, everywhere in spacetime, 
what exists also exists everywhere 


























































 Friebe With regard to the pointy-version, the first principle “E!x →  E!x” says that everywhere 
everything everywhere in the causal future (upper lightcone) still exists, and the sec-
ond principle “Sx → @x  ¬ E!x” says that for any spacetime-point s, at s, everywhere 
in the causal past of s, s did not yet exist. Therefore, Correia/Rosenkranz suggest:
Accordingly, at s, s is ‘new’ on any particle’s trajectory passing through s, while it continues to 
exist on this trajectory even after the latter has passed through s. Let us call this kind of view 
relativistic GBT. (CR 2018 149)
Now, my objection goes as follows. The “particle’s trajectory” – meant: a certain ti-
melike curve through s – has been introduced arbitrarily. Nothing in the account 
forbids, i.e. there is no contradiction with the two principles, to assume a spacelike 
curve through s along which the block should grow. Then, after the curve has passed 
through s, s does not continue to exist, which after all does not contradict the first 
principle that only says that everywhere in the causal future s still exists. The point 
is that by saying that along a trajectory something “continues” to exist, “after” some-
thing has passed, one uses a temporal language stemming from the concept of prop-
er-time (of that trajectory). This, however, is unjustified, given only the two principles.
The possibility of spacelike growing clearly shows the spatial analogue of the 
allegedly temporal passage, but one can avoid this with the bow-tie version accord-
ing to which, at any spacetime-point, the elsewhere region is completely populated.   
With regard to this version, the block cannot grow in spacelike direction, because 
therein everything already exists. However, the two principles hold relative to “any” 
particle’s trajectory (timelike curve). There are infinitely many such trajectories pass-
ing through s and, again, the question arises: what happens next, how does the block 
grow? Nothing comes next!
Here, the problem not only is that the neighborhood around s is partly emp-
ty but also that there are infinitely many directions in which the block could possi-
bly grow. All timelike curves through s are ontologically on a par, no one is privileged, 
so that without further assumptions the proponents of the GBT cannot tell in which 
way fresh slices of existence should be added. There are many ways to do so. This 
shows that the (missing) continuity of time is closely connected with the (missing) 
direction of time.
FIG 2 Pointy relativistic GBT: 
Possibility of spacelike ‘growing’
FIG 3 Bow-tie relativistic GBT: 



























































Therefore, I conclude that, without an adequate representation of time con-
tinuity, time directionality gets lost and so the temporal character of the intended 
existential dynamics as well. Something has to be done to close the gap. In the final 
section, I will suggest that Kantian consciousness-dependence of objective time flow 
could help.
IV. Kant’s Consciousness-dependence of Time
Usually, non-eternalists claim that temporal experience depends explanatorily on the 
objectively dynamical time. The assumption is that our experience and our percep-
tion are tensed (see, e.g., Soteriou 2013, chap. 4): one has the subjective impression of 
the passage of time. Given this, many philosophers believe that one can only under-
stand this fact, i.e. one can only explain our experience/perception, if one grants that 
objective time, in some way or other, also has the char-
acteristics of passage. 9 Given the foregoing, I take the 
opposite path: it is objective time that depends on time 
consciousness. However, this dependence is not (only) 
explanatory; I will not (only) argue that we can only un-
derstand that, e.g., Special Relativity is talking about ob-
jective time given our temporal experience/perception, 
our time consciousness. Rather, the dependence (also) is ontological, i.e. there only 
can be objective passage of time thanks to (in virtue of; grounded by) the conscious-
ness of time. Apparently, the analytic metaphysics of time cannot do justice to the 
continuity of time, i.e. to its genuine dynamical character, even if one considers the 
most promising account of an existentially dynamical 
ontology. 10 Now, the idea is that consciousness provides 
the missing link, namely so that the objective continui-
ty of time ontologically depends on time consciousness.
Such a consciousness-dependence is essen-
tially Kantian. Firstly, Kant famously claimed that (sub-
jective) time – time as pure intuition – is a condition of 
(the possibility of) the experience of objects or events in (objective) time. This makes 
objective time explanatorily dependent on subjective time: one can only arrive, a po-
steriori, at an understanding of objective temporal relations and temporal becoming 
because of subjective time, given a priori. Also famously, then, Kant provides a link 
between epistemology and ontology expressed by the slogan that the conditions (of 
the possibility) of experience also are conditions of the objects of experience (see, 
Kant 1781, A 111). This makes the temporal location of objects, temporal relations be-
tween objects, and the temporal becoming of (objective) events or processes ontolo-
gically dependent on the same conditions of their (possible) experience. Kant’s criti-
cal metaphysics can be summarized by the idea that metaphysical statements – such 
as that “there is objective temporal becoming” or that “there is objective causality 
(necessary connection) between events” – are in fact justified (against Hume), but 
only if they can be linked with the conditions of experience (against ‘dogmatic’ meta-
physicians such as Leibniz or Aristotle). 11 Applied to the 
purposes of this paper, temporal continuity is, for Kant, 
“empirically real” – objective, in the sense needed – but 
“transcendentally ideal”, i.e. originally subjective. About 
temporal continuity, and closest to the GBT, consider 
the following quotation: 12
9 Of course, there are also many 
eternalists who disagree and 
argue that the perceived pas-
sage can be explained, ‘although’ 
the objective world is a (tense-
less) block universe; see Deng 
(2017) and Sattig (2018).
10 To be fair, the MST seems 
to be safe at this point. As 
said, for dialectical reasons 
the MST appears in this paper 
as the contender that does not 
face the difficulties at issue.
11 This characterization of Kant’s 
metaphysical project can also 
be found, e.g., in Allais (2015).
12 For a similar reading of this 



























































[time] cannot be made representable to us except under the image of a line, insofar as we 
draw it (Kant 1787, B 156)
In philosophical reasoning, Kant says, one needs an “image” in order to make time rep-
resentable to us. Philosophical reasoning is partly metaphorical, and, for an adequate 
philosophical understanding of time, one needs the spatial analogue of “a line”. Purely 
conceptual reasoning – as it were with Cantor’s set-theoretical account in mind – is 
apparently not sufficient. Time is so peculiar, because it is originally pure intuition, 
that one must use intuition also while reasoning about time.
Then, Kant argues, the (needed) spatial analogue of a line is misleading (or, 
at least, risky): indeed, it does the intended job only “insofar” as one draws the line. 
Otherwise, the dynamical aspect of time gets lost. Only the drawing of the line – not 
the line as such – can be an image that makes the passage of time representable to 
us. This remark should be taken as evidence for the fact that, for him, time order is 
dependent on time direction. For, a (spatial) line can represent the temporal order of 
earlier/later-than only dependent on the (temporal) direction of drawing it.
Thus, for Kant, time directionality is more fundamental than time order. 
Kant is a non-eternalist: eternalists, by contrast, have less problems with the spatial 
analogue since they claim that time order – the B-theoretical relation – is the funda-
mental feature of time. Again, the MST is the most illuminating contender, because it 
makes mostly plausible that non-eternalists must hold contrariwise that time direc-
tion is the fundamental feature of time. In MST, some Cantorian set of points, such 
as a timelike curve in spacetime, represents a merely antisymmetric, irreflexive, and 
transitive order that turns into a temporal B-series of earlier/later-than only depend-
ent on the A-theoretic, directed motion of the objective presentness. The crucial 
problem with the GBT under discussion is that it has an order of precedence but not 
a notion of directionality. However, every version of non-eternalism should consid-
er time direction as fundamental. 13 Now, let me focus 
on the impression that Kant’s claim is close to the GBT. 
Apparently, for Kant, while being drawn, the line is al-
ways increasing. However, if “drawing” is nothing oth-
er than “adding fresh slices”, the problem of the next 
moment is still to be solved. As it seems, also Kant faces the difficulty that the direc-
tion of increasing (along the board) differs from the direction of adding slices (cross-
wise/perpendicular to the board). What we make representable to us by drawing a 
line, is apparently not a line inherently extending but a line always being made great-
er by the stick in our hand. This directionality-problem directly leads to the continu-
ity-problem: strictly speaking, again, the newest stuff on the board either creates a 
gap to the rest of the line, or cannot be pointlike, i.e. it adds at once a (small) line, not 
being progressively drawn. This would be the end of the story if one considers time 
as originally objective, in Kant’s terms: as “transcendentally real”.
Taken in isolation, the given quote talks about “real time” in the sense of 
current analytic metaphysics. If so, Kant, as well, can be confronted with the prob-
lem that the intended existential dynamics of time cannot be continuous: nothing 
comes next. Given the context of Kant’s work, however, “time” does not mean (an-
alytic) “real time”, i.e. transcendentally real time, but rather “objective time”, i.e. em-
pirically real time. Then, this same time also is, for Kant, 
transcendentally ideal, i.e. originally subjective. 14 This 
is the source of a solution to the problem of the time 
continuum: the last moment, i.e. the edge of the line, 
13 See for a defense of this funda-
mentality claim, also with respect 
to General Relativity, Friebe (2016).
14 Note that Kant here is not talk-
ing about time as purely sub-
jective (as pure intuition), but 



























































must be accompanied by consciousness.With regard to 
everything subjective, i.e. regarding every representa-
tion (intuitions; concepts) in us, Kant holds – again, fa-
mously – that:
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations. (Kant 1787, B 131)
Otherwise, the unity of the (transcendental) subject could not be established. Applied 
to the case at hand, this would mean that the I think must be able to accompany the 
representation of time, i.e. pure intuition. Self-consciousness, expressed by “I think, 
[…]”, establishes the unity of time. The unity of time is nothing other than the conti-
nuity of time, expressed by the drawing of the line, but not sufficiently so without be-
ing accompanied by the I think.
Transferred to the objectivized time – being no longer mere intuition but 
empirically real, i.e., so to speak, “actualized intuition” (=appearance): by conscious-
ly accompanying the last moment, the unity (=continuity) of the present could be 
established. There is no longer a discontinuous gap, since there really will be no next 
moment. The last moment, the edge of being, becomes 
its own, genuine direction of becoming. 15 There will be 
no next moment, because the alleged “next last mo-
ment” still is (and will be) the only last moment, in its 
activity of actualizing subjective time. This activity of 
actualizing subjective time essentially is time direction 
(not time order). It closes the gap of discontinuity, and 
so projects the direction of motion from the stick in our 
hand into the line that, by now, is inherently self-ex-
tending in the desired direction of the future. 16
V. Conclusion
Even the most promising account of an existential-
ly dynamical ontology cannot explain how time con-
stantly passes. Without the time continuum, however, 
the genuine temporal dynamics gets lost; the existen-
tial dynamics falls down the spatial-analogue objection. 
Kantian consciousness-dependence closes the gap by 
making objective time flow ontologically dependent on a subjective condition of ex-
perience: time as pure intuition (and imagination).
Although the paper focused on a specific variant of the GBT, the arguments 
given are perhaps sufficiently flexible as to also justify a more general suggestion: if 
one is after an ontology of temporal passage in the existentially dynamical sense of 
the term, the continuity/directionality of time provides the most serious challenge. 
The requirement can (only?) be satisfied by grounding objective time in subjective 
time, given a priori.
15 But: what about the past 
moments? Is this still an articu-
lation of the GBT or, instead, of 
presentism? – I would answer to 
these questions: it is neutral with 
regard to the GBT/presentism dis-
tinction, but it suggests that the 
past of the growing block is not 
simply an eternalist-like block. 
The GBT is not simply a combi-
nation of eternalism (regarding 
the past) and presentism (regard-
ing the future), but its past still 
is dynamical in the sense that 
the whole block is extending.
16 Probably at this point, Kant 
needs the capacity of imagination: 
what appears is present (as actu-
alized intuition) and, grounded on 
the actuality of such appearance, 
the imagination makes the future 
possible; see also Rosefeldt (2019) 
for the claim that Kant addition-
ally needs the imagination of time. 
subjective; otherwise the assump-
tion that Kant’s claim is close to 




























































Allais, L. (2015). Manifest reality. Kant’s idealism and his realism. Oxford/New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Broad, C. D. (1923). Scientific thought. London: Routledge.
Cameron, R. (2015). The Moving Spotlight. An essay on time and ontology. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Correia, F. & Rosenkranz, S. (2018). Nothing to come. A defence of the growing block 
theory of time. Cham: Springer (Synthese Library).
Id. (2019). Temporal existence and temporal location. Philosophical Studies, 
online-first.
Deasy, D. (2015). The Moving Spotlight Theory, Philosophical Studies, 172 (8), 
2073-2089.
Deng, N. (2017). Temporal experience and the A versus B debate. In I. Philips (Ed.), 
The Routledge handbook of philosophy of temporal experience (239-248). 
London: Routledge.
Friebe, C. (2016). Time order, time direction, and the presentist’s view on spacetime. 
Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy, 30 (2), 91-106.
Id. (2018). Metaphysics of laws and ontology of time. Theoria, 33 (1), 77-90.
Kant, I. (1781/87). Critique of pure reason. Transl. and ed. by P. Guyer & A.W. Wood 
(1998). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, D. (2004). Tensed quantifiers. In D. Zimmerman (Ed.), Oxford studies in 
metaphysics (3-14). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mellor, D. H. (1998). Real time II. London: Routledge.
Prauss, Gerold. (2019). Zur Begreifbarkeit der Ausdehnung von Zeit und Raum. Kant-
Studien, 110 (3), 397-412.
Rosefeldt, T. (2019). Kant on imagination and the intuition of time. In G. Gentry &
K. Pollock (Eds.), The imagination in german idealism and romanticism (48-65). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sattig, T. (2018). The sense of temporal flow: a higher-order account. Philosophical 
Studies, online-first.
Sider, T. (2001). Four dimensionalism: an ontology of persistence and time. Oxford/
New York: Oxford University Press.
Soteriou, M. (2013). The mind’s construction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tooley, M. (1997). Time, tense, and causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Williamson, T. (2013). Modal logic as metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
